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Abstract 
 
 
Regarding the epistemic warrant1 for ethical beliefs, I will make three arguments. First, that warrant for 
an ethical belief can only be transferred interpersonally if the adopter fully understands the justifications 
for that belief or takes the reasoning of the testifier as a proxy for their own. Second, that if most or all of 
one’s ethical beliefs are based on other’s testimony, that person will be living freely only if those beliefs 
were adopted with proper warrant. Third, that systems of oppression are unethical in part because the 
oppressed are expected to take on ethical beliefs from authority figures without valid warrant, rendering 
the oppressed unfree. I will specifically use patriarchal systems of oppression to illustrate this final point. 
 
 
 
 
1. The Limited Transferability of Epistemic Warrant for Ethical Beliefs 
 
Ethical beliefs are epistemically warranted by the reasons that justify them. The 
Kantian belief that lying is wrong is justified by the principle that one shouldn’t abuse 
another’s rational capacity (whether or not that belief and principle are true). If one has 
a belief with no justification, then that belief has no epistemic warrant. In fact, I am 
taking ‘epistemic warrant’ as simply referring to a sufficient reason or justification to 
hold a particular belief.  
 
Not all types of justification are sufficient to warrant an ethical belief. To illustrate, 
consider this example: You are undecided on the ethical permissibility of abortion. 
When speaking to your friend, you take on the belief that abortion is always wrong, 
solely because your friend said it was true. In this case, your belief is based on a reason, 
but it is not justified by a sufficient reason. This raises the question, what constitutes a 
sufficient reason or justification for an ethical belief? I will give an account that will 
explain why the example above is not an instance of sufficient justification.  
                                                          
1 Whenever ‘warrant’ is referred to, it should be understood specifically as epistemic warrant. 
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There are two types of sufficient reason that may warrant an ethical belief.2  The first is 
understanding the principles that account for that belief being true. The Kantian is 
justified in believing that lying is always wrong, because they believe that abusing a 
rational capacity is always wrong, and they understand how that principle accounts for 
the wrongness of lying. In addition, for a belief to be justified, the principle that 
explains it must also be justified. Otherwise, we would be taking beliefs based on 
totally unfounded principles, and thus the beliefs would not be justified at all. As such, 
a justified ethical belief requires a chain of justification between increasingly 
fundamental principles that account for the truth of one another. Whether these 
principles must ‘bottom out’ in a most fundamental, self-evident principle (the sort that 
is self-justifying) or whether these principles may justify one another in a circular, 
Coherentist fashion, I will leave standing in this paper. 
 
Now, if understanding as I have described it was the only way for us to have warranted 
ethical beliefs, then warrant could only be transferred in a very limited fashion. Only by 
receiving a complete account of the principles that justify a belief could one take on 
that belief with warrant. This type of transfer is reminiscent of a Socratic discussion 
format, whereby Socrates would lead one through a complete line of reasoning to arrive 
at the belief being argued for. Allan Gibbard refers to this type of transfer of ethical 
belief as Socratic Influence (174). One may even think of this type of discussion as not 
strictly constituting a transfer of warrant, but rather generating a new warrant for the 
one taking on the belief. This is due to the fact that the warrant is derived from one’s 
personal understanding of the justificatory relations between the principles that account 
for the belief. As such, it is more accurate to say that this type of Socratic influence 
leads one to generate their own warranted belief, rather than enabling the transfer of a 
pre-existing warrant.  
 
However, as alluded to earlier, there is a second means of transferring warranted ethical 
beliefs. It involves one treating another’s reasoning as a proxy for one’s own. Gibbard 
refers to this idea as Contextual Authority (174). The idea I will sketch is similar to 
Gibbard’s, but does not involve the background of Non-cognitivism that Gibbard 
accepts. With the moral realist assumption that I am using, Contextual Authority refers 
to one taking on another’s belief by treating the testifier as a proxy or delegate of one’s 
own reasoning. In Gibbard’s sense, this assignment of authority is justified because it is 
based on the context of shared social norms. In my usage, this delegation of reasoning 
is justified by the assumption of shared rational capacities and logical foundations. As 
such, I argue that Contextual Authority can be assigned to another even if there are few 
shared social norms, so long as there is reason to believe that there exists a context of 
shared basic logic and disposition for rational thought.3  Therefore, one may derive a 
                                                          
2 I make a single specific exception for children and certain adults in Section 1a. 
3 Here I make the assumption that rationality itself should be considered a fundamental cognitive 
capacity, rather than merely a social norm. 
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warranted ethical belief from another where there exists an assumed or demonstrated 
shared foundation of common rationality.  
 
To make this point clear, I would like to sketch several illustrative examples. Imagine 
that a detective is investigating a murder case and has a suspect. You and the detective 
share similar rational capabilities, and you both believe that murderers should be jailed 
if there is sufficient evidence of guilt. However, the detective is privy to more 
information about the case than you are. You are aware of this disparity in relevant 
information. The detective tells you that the suspect is guilty based on the evidence and 
so should be jailed. Based on the assumption of shared reasoning, you assign 
Contextual Authority to the detective, and take on her belief. This means that you 
believe that if you were in the detective’s position, you would personally reason to the 
same conclusions that the detective did. In doing so, you take on her belief that the 
suspect is guilty and so should be jailed, with an epistemic warrant for that belief. 
 
However, there are comparable circumstances in which you couldn’t assign Contextual 
Authority, if you have reason to believe that there is not sufficiently shared rational 
capacity. Suppose that an acquaintance attests to you that the suspect is guilty based on 
what logically follows from the evidence. However, you know that your acquaintance 
has a chronic cognitive impairment, which has severely limited her ability to reason 
clearly and construct valid logical arguments. As such, you could not assign Contextual 
Authority to the acquaintance and take on her belief with warrant, because you know 
that she does not have the same reasoning capacity as you. Therefore, you could not 
treat her reasoning as a proxy for your own. In other words, you do not have sufficient 
reason to think that, if you knew what she did, you would reach the same conclusions 
based on your own reasoning. Similar examples will arise where a testifier’s rationality 
is temporarily impaired by certain drugs or brain damage, based on the same principles.  
 
Contextual Authority may only be applied where one has reason to believe that there is 
shared rationality between the participants of the conversation. That judgment is a 
limiting requirement that reduces the circumstances in which Contextual Authority may 
be applied. This requirement is also what justifies one’s using Contextual Authority: 
one must use their own reason to judge whether there is sufficiently shared rationality. 
While one may use Contextual Authority based on an assumption of shared rationality, 
it must be a reasonable assumption. In this way, beliefs from Contextual Authority are 
still justified by one’s personal reason, even though they are allowing for a particular 
type of delegation of that reasoning.  
 
1a. On Children and Mentally Impeded Adults 
 
One point to address is that most children wouldn’t have many if any warranted ethical 
beliefs, according to what I have said thus far. Young children rarely if ever develop 
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complete justificatory chains of reasoning for an ethical belief, nor do they generally 
seem to treat the reasoning of others as a proxy for their own (see Gelman). This 
appears especially true for children and their parents. For example, when a parent tells 
their child that it is wrong to steal, and the child takes on that belief, they are most 
likely not reasoning that they would arrive at the same conclusion if only they had all 
the information their parent has. In other words, it seems that children are not often if 
ever assigning Contextual Authority to their parents. Rather, they seem to be assigning 
a different kind of authority, based on the hierarchical and protective relation between 
parent and child.  
 
At first glance, this may seem to be a problem for my previous theorizing, due to the 
fact that it simply seems strange that children have no epistemic warrant to believe 
what their parents say they should do. I address this issue by allowing for another type 
of authority assignment, limited in its application to young children and certain adults. I 
will designate this type as ‘Benevolent Authority’. One assigns this type of authority to 
their caretaker, when they have reason to believe that the caretaker genuinely has the 
person’s best interests in mind. For most unabused children, I will assume that this type 
of trust exists towards their parents as a biologically innate disposition supported by 
nurturing interactions. As such, children who have not been abused or otherwise given 
reason to distrust their parents have reason to believe that their parents act with the 
interests of the child in mind. Due to this fact, the child has a further reason to treat as 
true and justified the ethical testimony of their parents and other trusted caregivers. 
 
The same type of authority may be used by those adults who have their rational 
capacity impeded by cognitive impairments, whether those are sourced in disease or 
injury. For these adults, where their impediment is so severe that they require a 
caregiver, the same type of authority can be extended to that caregiver (see Etters, 
Goodall, & Harrison). The reasoning follows as with children: a person with a 
relatively lower capacity for reason who is dependent on another person to look after 
their wellbeing, has a warrant to believe what the caregiver says. This principle seems 
intuitive when considered by example. If a caretaker is walking with their ward, who 
has some cognitive impairment, and the caretaker says “You shouldn’t walk into the 
road without looking”, the dependent person has a sufficient reason to believe the 
ethical statement is true.  
 
The standards for what constitute a sufficient reason to believe something are relative to 
the reasoning ability of the person in question. Children do not simply have adult minds 
in smaller bodies. Children develop their reasoning capacities over a span of many 
years (see Gelman). As a healthy adult has a substantially greater capacity to reason 
than a young child, it makes sense that there would be differences in what constitutes a 
sufficient reason for belief between these two. Why one shouldn’t continue to assign 
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benevolent Authority as one enters rational adulthood will be explained in the context 
of living freely, in Section 2a. 
 
One may find that the type of paternalistic, benevolent authority I have been describing 
is unpleasantly reminiscent of the authority claimed by men over women in many 
patriarchal societies. The same goes for imperialistic and racially segregated societies, 
as well as other types of social oppression. I will address this exact point in Section 3. 
 
2.  Living Freely and Ethical Belief 
 
Whether someone can count as living freely, when most or all of their ethical beliefs 
are adopted from other people, depends on what we mean by ‘living freely’, and how 
those beliefs are adopted. I will understand ‘living freely’ as living autonomously, 
according to one’s own thoughts and beliefs, based on reasons from one’s own 
unimpeded rationality. I limit this definition as only applying to cognitively healthy 
adult human beings; I will not address what ‘free living’ constitutes for children or 
cognitively impaired adults. What I have argued for on understanding, Contextual 
Authority and Socratic Influence will be used to demonstrate the requirements for 
living freely in the context of adopted ethical beliefs.  
 
I’ve claimed that someone who is living freely must be living according to beliefs that 
are justified by their own reason. However, this does not entail that if someone lives 
according to any number of adopted beliefs, that person is necessarily unfree. In fact, I 
will argue that even if all of the ethical beliefs someone has are adopted from others, 
they may still be living freely. As I have said above, one may reasonably adopt beliefs 
where one delegates Contextual Authority to another based on an assumption of shared 
rationality. Likewise, one may be guided through a line of reasoning to arrive at a 
belief, which I have referred to as Socratic Influence. Each of these, Contextual 
Authority and Socratic Influence, are types of interpersonal influence that leads one to 
an epistemically warranted ethical belief. As such, I argue that one will be living freely 
only if their interpersonally adopted ethical beliefs are sourced from valid Contextual 
Authority or Socratic Influence.  
 
The reason that one may preserve their freedom while utilizing these interpersonal 
means of reaching ethical beliefs is because their personal reason is still the basis for 
the adoption of said beliefs. Contextual Authority is entirely based on the assumption or 
demonstration of common rational capacities. With common rational capacities, one’s 
reason is taken to be functionally equivalent to another’s. The reason Contextual 
Authority is justified is because it’s based on the belief that one would personally 
reason to the same conclusions if they had all the same information. With this 
explanation, we can see why Contextual Authority maintains one’s own capacity for 
reason, even though it is an interpersonal delegation.  
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That Socratic Influence does not impede one’s personal reason is clear: Socratic 
Influence depends on one using their own reason to follow the steps of an argument 
presented to them to understand its conclusion. Essentially, Socratic Influence leads to 
a personal understanding that I referred to at the outset: understanding a chain of 
justifications which together account for the final conclusion or belief. I would go so far 
as to say that Socratic Influence is not a subjugation of one’s personal reason but is 
actually a stimulation of it.  
 
According to these understandings of Socratic Influence and Contextual Authority, 
there are legitimate means for one to live freely even if one’s ethical beliefs are mostly 
or all adopted from other people. 
 
2a. Benevolent Authority and Living Freely 
 
The freedom of a rational adult is dependent on that person living according to their 
own thoughts and beliefs, justified by their own reason. Although one may validly take 
on another’s ethical beliefs, there are restrictions as to how one may do so while 
preserving their freedom. A rational adult’s ethical beliefs cannot be derived by 
assigning Benevolent Authority to others, because this constitutes a subjugation of 
one’s reason to another’s. For children, we are prepared to say that the dependence on 
their parents is justified by the fact that adults have a greater capacity to reason for the 
interests of the child than children do for themselves. However, between two rational 
and sober adults, there is no such inequality of basic rational capacity. Of course, there 
may be disparities of information or expertise that will warrant degrees of deference on 
particular matters; but these are already accounted for by the applicability of Contextual 
Authority.  
 
Benevolent Authority functions with the less rational child deferring to the judgments 
of the more rational parent. Between equally rational adults, there is no justification for 
this type of deference. As there is no justification for it, beliefs adopted by rational 
adults through Benevolent Authority are unwarranted. If someone is to live freely, they 
must be living according to their own reason. If one is living according to the 
unexamined reasoning of another, they are not living freely, by the established 
definitions. With the assumption that one ought to live freely, we conclude that a 
rational adult should not adopt beliefs by assigning Benevolent Authority to others.  
 
As has been alluded to, there are circumstances where adults may have warrant to adopt 
beliefs according to Benevolent Authority. Where there is a disparity of sobriety, if the 
intoxicated adult has a temporarily impeded rationality, then Benevolent Authority may 
have a legitimate roll. Again, this would also apply to those with certain types of mental 
illness that affect their reasoning abilities. However, the realistic exceptions to this rule 
are limited to only mental illness and intoxication.  
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3.  Systems of Patriarchal Oppression and Ethical Belief 
 
With all that has been previously said, the resources are established to give a thorough 
account for the ethical failure of oppressive societies such as patriarchies. At the outset, 
I will note that while I am specifying only one flaw of patriarchal and oppressive 
societies, that does not entail that this is the only flaw. Of course, there are many ethical 
problems with patriarchy that are unrelated to freedom and epistemic warrant, but those 
will not be discussed here. 
 
There are many ways to understand social oppression, but I will take a specific 
meaning, with oppression being the systematic restriction of free thought and action of 
a given social group by another group. According to the definitions I’ve developed, 
oppression prevents a certain social group from living freely.  
 
In patriarchal societies, there usually exists an expectation that women should defer to 
men as authorities, and therefore heed what men tell them about what they should do 
(see Gisborne). In this way, they are expected to take up men’s ethical beliefs for 
themselves. This demonstrates the oppressive nature of patriarchies, in that the 
independent ethical thought and subsequent action of women is usually restricted, 
manipulated and subjugated by men. Due to the fact that the free thought and action of 
women is partially or wholly obstructed in patriarchies, women are restricted from 
living freely in those societies. 
 
There are often narratives developed that attempt to justify the domination of women 
by men. Many of them boil down to this message: women are mentally inferior to men, 
and therefore they should listen to men about what they should do (see Gisborne). This 
is similar to how children are treated by their parents, with our description of 
Benevolent Authority. In some patriarchies, men claim a type of Benevolent Authority 
over women: they claim that, because they know best, it is really in women’s interests 
that they should listen and heed men’s directives (see Gisborne). Sources of patriarchal 
oppression may be external restrictions to the actions of women, but also take the form 
of manipulation designed to control the thoughts and beliefs of women. This latter type 
of oppression is equally if not more obstructive to the freedom of women. One may be 
able to think and believe freely, while having their actions externally restricted. 
However, if one’s very thoughts and beliefs have been manipulated and subjugated by 
an oppressor, then one’s actions will not be sourced from one’s own reason and will, 
rendering their oppression total. 
 
The argument for the Benevolent Authority of men over women crumbles with a 
rudimentary biological fact: there is no substantial difference between the reasoning 
capabilities of healthy adult men and healthy adult women (see Lynn). This use of 
Benevolent Authority is altogether unjustified, because women are fully equal to men 
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in their capacity for reason. It is true that there is some degree of sexual dimorphism in 
human psychology due to differences in hormones and brain structure (see Lynn), but 
clearly not to an extent that justifies treating women as a subordinate group, as one 
would children. To categorize adult women as a dependent class of people alongside 
children and the severely mentally ill is absurd not only in light of sound science, but 
also in light of the intellectual achievements of both famous and everyday women 
throughout history. This fact is in agreement with the experiences of any non-woman 
who has come to know unoppressed and even highly oppressed women to any 
significant degree.  
 
Now, there are some feminists that claim that in a patriarchal society, no woman should 
ever take on an ethical belief testified to her by a man (see Frye). I disagree respectfully 
with this overly strong conclusion. Healthy adult women, as fully capable rational 
beings, have the cognitive means to assign Contextual Authority to others, including 
men, to take on their beliefs with epistemic warrant. Healthy adult women have the 
capacity to follow a line of reason to reach its conclusion, as with Socratic Influence. 
Whether or not that line of reasoning is presented by a man or a woman should not 
affect the logical validity of the reasoning itself, which the woman is capable of 
accepting or rejecting according to her rational abilities. I do believe, however, that a 
healthy dose of skepticism towards men’s testimony is justified in light of the long 
history of patriarchy and the continuing struggles of sexual inequality. That said, we are 
not rationally led to the conclusion that women are incapable of taking on the beliefs 
presented by men without being conned or tricked into acting against their own 
interests.  
 
The argument I have presented on patriarchy can be immediately applied to other types 
of oppression, such as those involving racism, imperialism, or class-based 
discrimination, to demonstrate the unethical nature of these systems. A rational adult 
human being, in order to live freely, should only take on those ethical beliefs that are 
justified by their reason, be it directly or through a delegation based on common 
reasoning. As such, all systems of oppression, including patriarchy, as categorically 
limiting the freedom of a group of people, are unethical and indefensible. 
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